Archive for the ‘Asymmetric Demand’ Category

Asymmetric Demand is multi-sided demand

Tuesday, October 18th, 2011

by Philip Boxer

Social Flights, like airlines, provides flights. Except that Social Flights, unlike the airlines, has defined the demand they are responding to as asymmetric, developing a platform that can support the multi-sidedness of this demand. This is an early blog by them:

“Social Flights starts by enabling consumers to consider flying on private aircraft vs. commercial airlines. Our original theory was that “selling seats” and enabling consumers to create on demand flights would bring value to the market of travelers. We tested our theory, finding ways to lower the cost and present the better way to travel using social technology as the backbone for communicating with multiple markets of interest.”

Thus Social Flights is providing a business platform that can support a two-sided market: on the one side are travellers with particular routes in mind, and from the other side are the owners of private aircraft selling capacity on particular routes [1]. What makes it two-sided is the different relationship that Social Flights has with each side.

In describing the multi-sidedness of a market, we can usefully distinguish the following:

  • Customer situations – situations in which there is a need for a particular form of collaboration between customers and complementors. In this case, the need (for example) for members of a team to travel together to play an ‘away’ match.
  • Customers – the end-users within a customer situation i.e. the team members.
  • Complementors – the suppliers whose product/service offerings are needed within particular customer situations i.e. owners of private aircraft offering lower overall costs on the particular route.
  • Platform – the means by which customers and complementors are enabled to come together to form a collaboration i.e. the capability of Social Flights to bring customers and complementors together.[2]

Other multi-sided examples are shown below:

From the perspective of any one complementor, say an airline or a clinical specialty, the market is one-sided: they are there to provide flights or operations to the market.  This one-sided view of demand defines demand as symmetric to their service offering of a direct benefit.

But if they define their market as multi-sided, they must take an asymmetric view of demand, identifying the customer situations giving rise to the collaborations that include a demand for their particular service offering – the types of travel situation creating demand for their routes, or the types of patient condition creating demand for their clinical services. And they must organise their propositions to extract indirect value from these (asymmetric) customer situations, not just from particular (one-sided) direct demands. Code-sharing airlines or hospitals are the result [3].

Thus what makes the demand asymmetric is the competitive need to consider the larger situation within which the particular demand arises, and to take into account the way the interactions within that larger context affect the particular demand.[4] How does the business platform ‘extract value’?  It has to be able to support the greater social complexity involved. And it has to be able to support it in a way that creates value for the customer by reducing the customer’s costs of alignment of the various complementors to their particular situation.[5]

The take-home?  We have to be able to understand the relationship between the platform architecture and the variety of forms of indirect value it can

Footnotes
[1] See also Richard’s earlier blog on two-sided markets using the example of retailers.
[2] The platform approach thus enables the tension to be managed between rings and wedges (i.e. between the economies of scale & scope of particular services provided by complementors, and the economies of alignment involved in bringing them together as a collaboration responding to the customer situation as a whole).
[3] What is challenging in this, of course, is that it involves a change in the way the business defines its competitive identity – from a supply-side definition of itself (we fly these kinds of route or we perform these kinds of surgery) to a demand-side definition (we can organise your travel or we can manage the treatment of your condition). But this change in competitive identity also drives innovation and transforms industries.
[4] In terms of rcKP services at the edge, only the r-type proposition treats demand as one-sided, all the others becoming increasingly involved with the larger customer situation within which demand arises.
[5] This value for the customer is indirect value from the perspective of the platform.  The need to establish economies of alignment is currently a major issue in public services, where the government ultimately pays for these indirect costs arising when citizens fall into the gaps between direct public services. This kind of analysis was used in a Swiss e-Government case (also outlined in this blog and published here).

Supporting social complexity in collaborative enterprises

Wednesday, October 12th, 2011

by Philip Boxer
Richard’s presentation at the UNICOM Enterprise Architecture Forum was on Next Generation Enterprise Architecture (EA).  In it he distinguished two agendas:

  1. Simplify and Unify systems to align them with the business, and
  2. Differentiate and Integrate systems to help manage complexity.

In the first case the drive is towards a single unified system supporting the enterprise, while with the second it is towards differentiated systems brought together under a central authority as a system-of-systems.

He then introduced a third agenda in which the forms of integration could themselves be differentiated, enabling systems to be brought together in varieties of ways forming different systems-of-systems.  This third agenda he associated with enterprises that were having to form collaborative alliances with other enterprises, working within business ecosystems [1] to meet multi-sided demands [2].

My own presentation on supporting social complexity in collaborative enterprises addresses this third agenda. It describes multi-sidedness and gives a number of case examples, including e-Government and Healthcare.  It makes the point that with this third agenda, the architecture of the enterprise is not longer the primary concern.  Rather it is understanding the variety of ways in which the social complexity of collaborations create value for the customer, and therefore how, from the perspective of the supplier, platform architectures can capture indirect value.[3]

Footnotes
[1] A business ecosystem is made up of numbers of operationally and managerially independent suppliers and customers interacting with each other in support of many different kinds of demand (e.g. the suppliers of the products, applications and services clustering around customers’ uses of Apple’s iPhone platform).
[2] A one-sided demand is one that the supplier can define its product or service in a way that is independent of the context within which it is used by the customer (e.g. the demands met by a retail outlet).  A multi-sided demand is one in which this is not possible, so that the supplier must take account of how the customer uses its product or service in combination with other products and services (e.g. the multiple interacting services involved in treating a complex medical condition).
[3] A platform architecture is the means by which East-West accountability can be delivered, providing a way of managing the tension between rings and wedges.


A Categorial expression of Demand Asymmetry

Thursday, July 28th, 2011

by Philip Boxer

Some papers sent to me recently by James D. Smith, II at Carnegie Mellon’s SEI set me thinking about how demand asymmetry might be expressed in Category Theoretic terms. Work by Nick Rossiter et al uses category theory to establish a natural basis for interoperability, comparing functors representing the constructs under which an enterprise organizes its data.    This work argues that the conditions for semantic interoperability between systems depend upon their functors commuting at all levels.  Heather et al use this to argue the need for a global enterprise (my italics):

Modern information systems operate at every level: from data held in a single purpose fixed device, through common PCs at home or mobile computing with business systems of an SME, to databases, intra-acting locally and at national level, inter-acting between nation states and even then open to wider global systems outside of Europe. This interoperability requires global coherence which in synecdoche correlates with the interoperation of the EU itself.

Semantic interoperability defined in this way cannot accommodate the pragmatics of demand that involve going beyond the perimeter of a single sovereign enterprise.   The enterprise may be forced to deal with demand asymmetry.

Let us say that an enterprise is an enterprise context, defined by the existence of a natural transformation between the functors representing its sub-contexts i.e. its functors commute at all levels. These sub-contexts may be further refined by defining sub-sub-contexts etc in terms of sub-functors.  In these terms, the hierarchy of the enterprise can be expressed in terms of the ‘is-part-of’ relations between the enterprise context and these subordinate functors representing subordinate enterprise contexts.

Let us now say that a customer situation (the experiencing of a need) is also defined as a natural transformation between the functors representing its sub-situations. These sub-situations may be further refined by defining sub-sub-situations etc in terms of sub-functors. In these terms, an effects ladder for the customer situation will be expressed in terms of the relations between the customer situation and its subordinate functors representing subordinate situations.

For example, a hospital is an enterprise, with one of its sub-contexts providing a hip-replacement service.  A patient’s condition would then be a customer situation, the need for a hip replacement being one of this condition’s sub-situations.

Now consider that the patient’s condition demands a number of different treatments provided by different specialist organizations – physiotherapy, home nursing, orthoses, home help. This would be a demand higher up the patient’s effects ladder, addressing more of the need arising from their condition (and thereby reducing the patient’s value deficit).   Let us say that a geometry-of-use is a functor composing some number of sub-functors within the hierarchies of some number of different enterprises.   A stratification can be expressed in terms of  the ‘is-used-by’ relations between the geometry-of-use and these sub-functors, representing how these sub-functors are composed.

Which brings us to demand asymmetry.  A demand arising from a customer situation is asymmetric for an enterprise if the functor of the geometry-of-use can not be made to commute at all levels with the functors of the enterprise i.e. there is no natural transformation between the functor for the customer situation and that of the enterprise as a whole. It is this demand asymmetry that forces us onto the ground of collaborative systems of systems and beyond.

Asymmetric Demand for Defence Equipment

Friday, October 16th, 2009

by Richard Veryard

An independent review into the way the MOD buys equipment for Britain’s Armed Forces was published yesterday, Thursday 15 October 2009. [Report, MoD News Article, BBC News]. Key finding.

“The Ministry of Defence has a substantially overheated equipment programme, with too many types of equipment being ordered for too large a range of tasks at too high a specification. This programme is unaffordable on any likely projection of future budgets.”

That situation might sound familiar to a lot of managers, not just in the defence sector.

The report makes some favourable comments about the Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) programme, but indicates a lack of hard financial data that would be required to make quantitative decisions. As regular readers of this blog may recall, there has been some discussion along these lines published in the RUSI Journal, including Agility and Innovation in Acquistion (Feb 2008) and The Meaning of Value-for-Money (Feb 2009).

The explanation for the current crisis can be found in the essential multi-sidedness of the defence acquisition ecosystem. Traditional cost accounting approaches (such as activity-based costing) fail to address the complexity of this multi-sidedness, and researchers are urgently seeking alternative cost accounting methods appropriate for complex systems-of-systems.

One of the key issues for Through Life Capability Management is that any errors or omissions in the long-term equipment programme must be repaired through what are known as Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR), which over the long haul can prove far more expensive and inflexible than the planned equipment.

The report also praises the Smart Acquisition programme, and expresses regret that the disciplines of Smart Acquisition have been somewhat diluted by recent reorganization.

***

Is this report only relevant to the defence sector, or can other sectors glean anything useful? My view is that the complexities of multi-sided markets and asymmetric demand can be found in many, perhaps most sectors. And the question of coordinating effectively between short-term and longer-term spending can be found in many domains, notably IT. I have little doubt that whatever management tools and techniques are developed by the MoD and its partners to address this problem will eventually trickle into civilian management.

Two-Sided Markets

Saturday, November 11th, 2006

by Richard Veryard

There has been a lot of buzz around two-sided and multi-sided markets lately.

In his HBS March interview, Andrei Hagiu identifies Wal-Mart as an example of an organization that is transforming from a traditional merchant into a two-sided platform. Let’s look at the (asymmetric) structure of this transformation.

The traditional retailer acts as a hub in the food supply chain, aggregating food supply from fields and factories, and distributing food to workshops and private kitchens. This is essentially a positional strategy: the retailer seeks to establish and maintain a strategic position within a value chain, as the bottleneck/hinge point between upstream and downstream. Within the positional strategy, the business drivers are understood in terms of the economics of scale and the economics of scope.

2sidepositional.gif

But if we shift from a value-chain perspective to a service-oriented perspective (effects-ladder), we can see that the retailer is providing a service (=delivering value) downwards as well as upwards – it is a food distribution platform for farmers and manufacturers as well as a food supply platform for consumers and catering companies.

So instead of drawing the merchant in the middle, we can draw the merchant as a new kind of platform providing various kinds of market interaction.
2siderelational.gif
This takes us from a positional strategy to a relational strategy. No longer just focused on the economies of scale and scope, the relational strategy emphasizes how economies of governance are generated in relation to two kinds of demand context. The big question for a company such as Wal-Mart is how to balance the exploitation of each of these forms of asymmetric advantage.

Managing to Relationship

Monday, April 17th, 2006

by Richard Veryard

Masood Mortazavi uses Transaction Cost Economics to explain the difference between Managing to Contract vs. Managing to Relationship. In this post, I want to link this discussion to the key notions of Asymmetric Demand and Asymmetric Governance.


“Managing to contract” implies a two-phase procurement process. In the first phase, all possible scenarios are identified, and a contract is negotiated that defines rights and obligations for each scenario. In the second phase, the emphasis is on compliance with the agreed rights and obligations. Unfortunately, it is hard to find good sources for this phrase on the Internet. Most of the hits lead to the antique humour of “managing to contract disease“. In contrast, “managing to relationship” implies a degree of trust between the parties, and an expectation that issues will be resolved to mutual advantage. Under certain simplifying conditions, there may be no observable difference between managing to contract and managing to relationship. The greatest observable difference can be found in highly complex procurement arrangements, involving either long-running contracts, or a series of separate contracts within a long-running relationship.Managing to relationship may still involve detailed contractual negotiations, but the emphasis is often upon establishing a collaborative governance process, rather than an attempt to anticipate all possible scenarios.

Masood draws three axioms from Transaction Cost Economics:

  1. open, competitive markets cannot always provide goods and services that are needed (asymmetry)
  2. contracts are inherently incomplete (bounded rationality, uncertainty)
  3. relationships as safeguards against opportunistic defections (game theory?)

Drawing on these axioms, we can see that the limitations of managing to contract are not just based on economic inefficiency (excessive transaction costs) but on ethical asymmetry – including asymmetric information and moral hazard. Managing to contract can produce destructive tactical behaviours such as chicken.

Chicken: the first party to flinch is the loser. So when a project is going off track, each party tries to ignore the evidence that things are going wrong, in the hope that the other party will bail out first and bear all the costs.

So there are some basic structural problems with traditional procurement arrangements, and managing to relationship won’t solve these problems alone.

Security and Symmetry

Saturday, March 25th, 2006

by Richard Veryard

Phil Wainewright asks

Are we honestly supposed to believe it was a co-ordinated denial-of-service attack that brought down a demonstration application on Sun’s much-touted pay-as-you-go Grid service on the day of its launch this week?

Phil suggests that two explanations are equally plausible – one in terms of security and one in terms of unanticipated levels of demand – since these two explanations might both generate pretty much the same outcome.

In a symmetric world, there is a clear distinction between genuine customers and hostile attackers – and the task of security is to tell them apart and keep them apart. We can easily separate security from marketing, because there is no interference between these two activities. We can install perimeter-based security, which prevents bad people from accessing our services.

In an asymmetric world, this distinction (and the deconfliction between marketing and security) breaks down. This asymmetry is one of the key drivers for the current interest in deperimeterization, as promoted by the Jericho Forum.

Disney, Pixar, Apple and Jobs

Monday, February 6th, 2006

by Richard Veryard
John Hagel posts some interesting comments about Disney, Pixar and Jobs. He is sceptical about the strategic contribution that Steve Jobs may be able to make to Disney.

  • large media companies need to figure out how to become relationship companies
  • media products need to become platforms
  • the future of large media companies hinges upon the mindset and skills required to build loosely coupled products
  • (and focusing on) creating networks to get better faster
  • This is essentially an argument for a relational strategy in response to asymmetric demand. Hagel argues that “scale and scope economies in the media business are migrating away from products”. This may be true for most media companies, but many people may wonder whether it really applies to Disney/Pixar? How asymmetric is the demand for the latest cartoon film? Surely these cartoons are always going to remain mass market products, long after other media products and services have been fragmented and customized?

    Of course it’s not as simple as that. Consider the increasing complexity of the cartoon whole-product. Besides the film itself, we are urged to consume the music, the computer games, the ringtones, the toys, even the books. Cartoon characters are printed on breakfast cereal packets, and given away by fast food outlets. Thus there is a considerable ecosystem of commercial exploitation. One of the strategic issues for Disney/Pixar is the delicate balance between narrow control of the brand (ultimately how the cartoon characters are experienced around the world) and broad encouragement of creativity and innovation within the brand.

    This is perhaps not so very different from the challenges that Steve Jobs faced at Apple. John Hagel is critical of Apple, and attributes Apple’s commercial failure to Jobs’ thinking of the computer as a product rather than as a platform. So how do we interpret Apple’s recent success with iPod and iTunes? Surely these are successful platforms, not just products. Look at the explosion of new practices (such as podcasting) that these platforms support.

    But there is a critical difference between the product/platform shift (which is a response to the second asymmetry) and the positional/relational shift (which is a response to the third asymmetry). Can Disney / Pixar / Apple ignore the third asymmetry – and for how long?

    DoJ search requests

    Friday, January 20th, 2006

    by Richard Veryard
    cross posted from SOAPbox blog

    Various people talking about the dispute between Google and the US Department of Justice (DoJ).

    Boing Boing, Search Engine Watch, Emergent Chaos, Graham Shevlin.

    One line of discussion relates to privacy. Some commentators are praising Google for resisting the US Government’s demands for data, when its competitors have apparently complied.

    But there is another important consideration, which appears relevant to Google’s position. There is an huge gap (asymmetry) between the information requirement (as stated by the DoJ) and the data on Google’s database. (See especially Danny Sullivan’s post at SearchEngineWatch.)

    So the DoJ is hoping to solve a complex problem with very large amounts of data? Does it really make sense for the DoJ to copy the raw data from Google onto its own processors? In a service-oriented grid-enabled world, it would seem to make more sense (and raise fewer privacy concerns as well) for the DoJ to collaborate with Google (and its competitors) – to compose intelligent and relevant analytical enquiries that can be run by Google (as a service, albeit commandeered by the Government) to help solve the DoJ’s problem.

    Of course Google is an interested party in the outcome of the DoJ’s deliberations, but does engaging it as a trusted partner in the analysis really increase its ability to bias the outcome in a self-interested way? And if it provides knowledge and metadata services rather than raw data, this might mitigate the threat to its position as a trusted custodian of personal search records?

    Banking Services and User-Defined Policy 2

    Wednesday, January 11th, 2006

    by Richard Veryard
    Who is going to want the kind of user-defined policies I talked about in the podcast (link to soundfile, transcript extract)? Is it just the higher-end type of customer, as Ron suggests?

    Hypothesis One: The better-off customers have the more complex requirements. Their financial arrangements are more subtle, their consumer electronics are more sophisticated, and there is much greater scope for interoperability.

    Hypothesis Two: The technically literate consumers are most able to articulate the more complex requirements. They are more willing to experiment with the available options, and to learn to express their requirements in an appropriate policy language. In consumer electronics, they are the ones who know the difference between an Ethernet cable and a USB port, and how to tweak the firewall.

    Hypothesis Three: The lead times are getting shorter. Even if it is currently the better off and technically literate consumers who are the early adopters of this complexity, service providers should anticipate the possible mass adoption of some aspects of this complexity within a fairly short timescale.

    Hypothesis Four: Although the better-off and technically literate customers may be the ones who currently understand and express these complex requirements, that doesn’t mean that the rest of the customers don’t have these requirements. Everyone needs security; and the less money you have to start with, the more you suffer if someone steals a hundred dollars from your account.

    Hypothesis Five. Where end-users are not able or willing to engage with the technical necessities (such as writing their own policy statements in some technical mark-up language), there will be intermediate services that will do this. For example, financial advisers may start to see their role as helping the client to orchestrate and manage a complex set of financial services from a range of service providers, instead of simply helping to select financial products. There are also opportunities for self-help groups and communities to emerge, where the complexity is managed collectively at group level, rather than at the individual level.

    Hypothesis Six. Ultimately, the complexity is supported by a platform of composable services providing the right balance of flexibility and efficiency. The strategic question now becomes one of platform dominance. (The banks may be privately thinking about this question, but I haven’t seen much evidence of it yet.)

    Hypothesis Seven: In the short-term, banks might be tempted to focus on the higher-end type of customer if they really were the most profitable. But there may not be enough of them to cover the costs of supporting them effectively. A more strategic reason for focusing on the higher-end type of customer might be because of innovation. But there may be just as much innovation (and greater social benefit, as well as reasonable long-term profitability) from supporting a “long tail” of lower-end customers, either directly or through appropriate communities and intermediaries.